Ontario Court of Appeal Clarifies the “Good Character” Requirement: Law Society of Ontario v. AA

The Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2026 ONCA 47, provides important guidance on the “good character” assessment in professional regulation, the limits of licensing conditions, and anonymization in professional regulation proceedings.

The Court upheld the Law Society’s motion for judicial review. In doing so, it set aside the Law Society Tribunal’s Hearing Division’s decision finding an applicant to be of good character despite three admitted instances of sexual abuse of children and remitted the matter to the Hearing Division for reconsideration.

Background

In 2012, the applicant, anonymized by the Tribunals and Court as “AA”, sought admission to the Ontario bar. He failed to disclose, however, that in 2009 he had sexually abused three children, including his daughter. After the Society launched an investigation, he withdrew his application in 2017.

In 2019, he applied again. AA’s licensing application was referred to a hearing under s. 27(4) of the Law Society Act, which requires a hearing before an application can be refused on good character grounds. The Hearing Division concluded that AA was of good character and permitted licensing subject to a condition that he be supervised in any meeting with minor children. That decision was upheld by the Law Society’s Appeal Division  and Ontario’s  Divisional Court.

The Law Society appealed to Ontario’s Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal’s Framework for Assessing “Good Character”

The Law Society of Ontario, like most Canadian professional regulators, requires all licensees to be “of good character”. The oft-cited test for good character, from Armstrong v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSHP 29, considers the following factors:

(1)         The nature and duration of the misconduct;

(2)         Whether the applicant is remorseful;

(3)         What rehabilitative efforts have been taken and their success;

(4)         The applicant’s conduct since the misconduct; and

(5)         The passage of time since the misconduct.

These factors are not, however, a checklist. Rather, the Court held the good character analysis must be weighed holistically and rooted in the text, context, and purpose of the Law Society Act—that is, regulation in the public interest. As such, it  set a two-part analysis for good character: the Armstrong factors + a contextual analysis of the statute and broader public interest.

The Hearing Division’s decision was found to be unreasonable because, although it applied the Armstrong factors, it failed to consider whether granting AA a licence would be consistent with public trust and confidence in the legal profession.

Licensing Conditions Cannot Cure a Deficient Character Finding

The Tribunal’s reliance on a demographic licensing condition prohibiting AA from being alone with minors was also a concern on Appeal.

The Court recognized that the Tribunal has broad discretionary authority under the Law Society Act to attach conditions to an applicant’s licence.  However, it indicated it is well settled that a condition cannot be imposed to “bootstrap” an applicant up to the level of good character. A condition that implicitly acknowledges an ongoing risk—especially one touching on trust, vulnerability, and safety—undermines the conclusion that the applicant is of good character in the first place.

The Court noted that the disciplinary context wherein conditions, including demographic conditions, are sometimes imposed is distinct from the licensing context. This is because, according to the Court:

Once a licensed lawyer engages in misconduct, the consideration of the Tribunal in determining an appropriate remedy in the face of that misconduct asks different questions than those which are relevant to a good character determination. The Tribunal is not concerned with the trustworthiness of an applicant, but rather how trust in the subject lawyer might be restored, and how the protection of the public in the face of the risk posed by the lawyer’s misconduct might be assured.

AA’s demographic licensing condition suggests he could not be trusted with all the responsibilities of licensure. It also eroded public trust and confidence in the legal profession.

Anonymization and the Open Court Principle

The Court also addressed whether AA’s identity should remain anonymized on appeal.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s framework in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, the Court concluded that anonymization was justified at this stage. Public identification of AA would likely reveal the identity of his daughter as a victim of sexual abuse, exposing her to serious psychological harm. That harm outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle in the circumstances of the appeal.

Importantly, the Court underscored that any party could return to the Court and request the order be set aside following the resolution of the good character proceedings. The Court notes the balancing exercise is “fact-specific” and may shift if circumstances change—for example, if AA ultimately obtains a licence and public transparency about licensing decisions becomes more compelling.

Outcome

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society’s appeal, set aside the Hearing Division’s decision, and remitted the matter for reconsideration by a differently constituted panel, applying the correct legal framework.

Key Takeaways

• The good character analysis is a purposive, contextual, public-interest inquiry, involving a two-step analysis. It is not a mechanical application of rehabilitation factors.
• Licensing conditions cannot compensate for unresolved character concerns.
• Anonymization remains exceptional and contextual, particularly where the interests of victims and the open court principle intersect.